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Selective pressures for the evolutionary emergence of human language tend to be 
interpreted as social in nature, i.e., for better social communication and coordination. 
Using a simple neural network model of language acquisition we demonstrate that even 
using language for oneself, i.e., as private or inner speech, improves an individual’s 
categorization of the world and, therefore, makes the individual’s behavior more 
adaptive. We conclude that language may have first emerged due to the advantages it 
confers on individual cognition, and not only for its social advantages. 
1. Introduction 
1.1. Talking-to-oneself and language evolution 
Human language has evolved. If we go back sufficiently in time we find 
ancestors of present-day humans who did not have language and then, some 
time later, ancestors who did have language. What is less clear is how and why 
language has evolved. If any capacity has evolved one can ask what adaptive 
advantages the possession of that capacity conferred to the individuals that 
possessed the capacity over other individuals that lacked it, even if this should 
not necessarily imply a pan-adaptivist view of evolution.  
In the case of language it seems clear that language may have evolved 
because it conferred social advantages by dramatically improving the 
communicative capabilities of human beings which in turn improved 
coordination among individuals. The idea that language is just a very complex 
and powerful communication system can indeed be considered as the ‘standard 
view’ in the debate on language evolution (see, for example, Knight et al., 2000; 
Hurford, 2002; Pinker & Jackendoff, 2005). 
Another less often explored possibility is that human language may have 
evolved because it made the cognitive functioning of single individuals more 
effective. Unlike animal communication systems human language can be used 
not only socially but also individually. It can be used to communicate with other 
individuals, by asking them information or providing them with information or 
 by asking them to do one thing or another, but it can also be used to talk with 
oneself, to comment on what one sees, to put one’s predictions, explanatory 
hypotheses, and plans into words. These individual uses of language can result 
in more effective behaviours on the part of the individual even when the 
individual is acting alone, and this may have represented a reproductive 
advantage and a selective pressure for the emergence of language. 
The idea that the main function of language is communication has been 
criticized by Bickerton (1990) and Chomsky (2002), who argue, from different 
standpoints, that language is fundamentally a system of mental representation 
and thought. Nevertheless, in the literature on language evolution the individual 
functions of language tend either to be ignored or to be thought to have 
appeared much more recently than it would be required if these uses acted as a 
selective pressure for the initial emergence of human language. It is assumed 
that human beings have learned to talk to themselves when their language was 
already completely developed and indistinguishable from the language spoken 
by present-day humans. The initial selective pressures for the emergence of 
language were social. When language was already evolved and fully modern, 
humans found that it could be usefully used to talk to oneself and not only to 
talk to others. But it is not clear that this is necessarily so. It is possible that even 
a very simple form of proto-language, consisting of words (or holophrases) that 
correlate with relevant experiences, can give important individual advantages if 
it is used not only for communication but also for talking to oneself. In this 
paper we use artificial neural network simulations for exploring the influence 
that a very simple form of proto-language can have on the categorization 
abilities of an individual when the language is used to talk to oneself, in private 
speech or in inner speech. 
1.2. Related work 
The idea that language is not only a system of communication but also a very 
powerful aid to cognition dates back at least to the 1930s, with the work of 
Russian psychologist Lev Vygotsky. Vygotsky (1978) considered language as a 
cognitive tool, whose development in the child and whose evolution in the 
species is the prerequisite to the development of all specifically human high-
level psychological functions. Despite the fact that this idea has been somehow 
neglected in mainstream psychology, recently it has been raising increasing 
interest in the cognitive sciences (Gentner & Goldwin-Meadow, 2003) and is at 
the core of the interesting speculations on the evolution of human mind of such 
philosophers as Daniel Dennett (1991) and Andy Clark (2005). Indeed, there is 
 a growing body of empirical evidence demonstrating the importance of 
language for a number of cognitive functions including, for example, learning 
(Nazzi & Gopnik, 2001), memory (Gruber & Goschke, 2004), analogy making 
(Gentner, 2003) and problem solving (Diaz & Berk, 1992).  
From the computational modeling point of view, there have been a few 
attempts to study the possible individual advantages that language can confer to 
those who possess it. Lupyan (2005) has demonstrated, with artificial neural 
networks, that learning to name perceived stimuli can facilitate category 
learning, especially the learning of those categories which are more difficult to 
learn. Using an artificial life framework, Cangelosi and Harnad (2000) have 
studied the adaptive advantage of what they call ‘symbolic theft’, that is the 
learning of new categories by hearsay from combinations of labels describing 
them. The results of their simulations show that organisms which employ 
symbolic theft outperform those which learn categories only by ‘sensory-motor 
toil’, that is, through trial-and-error and direct experience with objects. In 
previous work (Mirolli & Parisi, 2005b), we have shown that the use of a simple 
signalling system not only for communicative purposes but also for talking to 
oneself can facilitate the evolutionary emergence of the communication system 
itself. In particular, we have demonstrated that linguistic signals that benefit the 
hearer but not the speaker do not evolve if they are only used for 
communication while they do evolve if the hearer has to repeat the signals to 
himself or herself as an aid to memory. Finally, in a previous model on which 
the present work is based (Mirolli & Parisi, 2005a), we have shown that the 
coupling between the linguistic and the sensory-motor systems of an organism 
can improve categorization even after learning has taken place. In fact, we have 
shown that the internal representations of objects are improved if the objects are 
perceived together with the labels that designate them. In the previous model the 
linguistic input was always social, coming from another individual. In the 
present work we develop the model by studying the effects of language on 
categorization when the individual is all alone and he or she talks to herself 
either externally, with private speech, or internally, with inner speech.  
2. A simple neural network model of language acquisition 
We assume that we can divide this process of language acquisition in two 
stages. In the first stage the learner’s brain functions as two functionally 
separated modules, the sensory-motor module and the linguistic module, which 
are modeled as two independent feed-forward three-layer neural networks (see 
figure 1a). In the sensory-motor module the input units encode the sensory 
 properties of perceived objects that can belong to four different categoriesa. In 
the first, pre-linguistic stage the sensory-motor module learns (by a standard 
back-propagation learning algorithm) to classify perceived objects by producing 
in the output units a specific activation pattern which represents the action 
appropriate to the category of the object. On the other hand, the input units of 
the linguistic module encode the acoustic properties of heard linguistic sounds 
and the linguistic module learns (by back-propagation) to imitate heard sounds, 
that is, to produce in its output units the same activation pattern that has been 
received in the input unitsb. Overall, the first stage of learning is meant to model 
the first year of life of the child, when the child acquires both non-linguistic 
sensory-motor mappings and the ability to imitate heard sounds but there still is 
no learning of the mapping between linguistic sounds and their meanings. 
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Figure 1. The neural network. During the first stage of learning (a) the two modules learn their 
respective tasks independently of one another. During the second stage of learning (b) new 
connections linking the two modules appear or become functional and their synaptic weights are 
progressively adjusted so that the overall network learns to map objects into the linguistic sounds 
that designate them (speaking) and linguistic sounds into actions (understanding). 
In the second stage, in which language learning in the proper sense begins, 
the two modules become functionally connected by the development of two new 
sets of synaptic connections, one linking the hidden layer of the sensory-motor 
module to the hidden layer of the linguistic module and the other linking the 
hidden layer of the linguistic module to that of the sensory-motor module 
(figure 1b). The second stage of learning, which is meant to model language 
learning in the proper sense, consists in adjusting the weights of these two new 
sets of connections (through a delta-rule learning algorithm) in such a way that 
(a) the internal representation evoked in the sensory-motor hidden units by a 
                                                          
a There are 120 different objects for each category, created by changing the 
category’s prototypical perceptual pattern. 
b For symmetrical reasons, there are also 120 real instantiations of the same 
words, each differing slightly from the word’s prototype. 
 perceived object will tend to produce the internal representation evoked in the 
linguistic hidden units by the linguistic sound normally co-occuring with the 
object in the learner’s experience, and vice versa, (b) the internal representation 
of a heard sound in the linguistic hidden units will tend to evoke its ‘meaning’, 
that is, the internal representation of the object normally experienced together 
with the sound. This results in the ability to speak by mapping non-linguistic 
inputs into the appropriate phono-articulatory movements (e.g., saying “apple” 
in response to the sight of an apple) and in the ability to understand language by 
mapping heard linguistic sounds into the appropriate non-linguistic actions (e.g., 
approaching the speaker in response to the linguistic sound “come here!”).  
3. How language affects categorization 
In order to study how language affects categorization, we analyzed the internal 
representations of perceived objects in five different conditions, which we call 
(a) no-learning, (b) no-language, (c) social language, (d) private speech, and (e) 
inner speech. In our model, the internal representation of a perceived object is 
the activation pattern that is evoked in the sensory-motor hidden units by the 
perceived object. Activation patterns in a set of units can be represented as 
points in an abstract space with the same number of dimensions as the number 
of units in the corresponding layer of units and with each dimension of the space 
representing the level of activation of the corresponding unit, say, from 0 to 1. A 
particular internal activation pattern will be represented by a specific point 
located in the appropriate position with respect of each dimension, reflecting the 
activation level of the corresponding unit in the pattern. All the different 
members of a specific category of objects, say, all different apples, will be 
represented as a cloud of points. At the beginning of learning in the first stage, 
since all the connection weights are random, the cloud of points representing the 
internal activation patterns evoked by the different apples will be very large and 
it will largely overlap with the cloud of points representing other categories of 
objects. This is what is actually observed (see figure 2a). At the end of learning, 
the internal representations of objects belonging to the same category will form 
much better clouds, that is, clouds which are much smaller, do not overlap with 
other clouds, and have a considerable distance between their respective centers 
(figure 2b). Notice that the clouds in both the no-learning and no-language 
conditions are calculated by giving to the network only the perceptual properties 
of the object (figure 3a). 
In order to test whether social language affects the internal representations 
of objects we calculated our clouds (categories) by making the network perceive 
 objects accompanied by instances of the linguistic sounds that normally 
accompany the objects in the learner’s experience (figure 3b). The results, 
shown in figure 2c, demonstrate that language improves categorization in that 
the clouds of different categories of objects are now both smaller and more 
distant from one another than the clouds of objects unaccompanied by language. 
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Figure 2. Internal representations of objects in the conditions of no-learning (a), no-language (b), 
social language (c), private speech (d), and inner speech (e). See text for details. 
In order to study whether language can improve categorization not only if it 
is used socially but also if it is used individually, we simulated two ways in 
which humans can talk to themselves: externally, by speaking aloud but to 
themselves (private speech), and internally, by using language inaudibly (inner 
speech). In the private speech condition (figure 3c) the individual encounters an 
object and prior to responding to the object the individual produces the 
linguistic sound that designates the object. The individual hears the sound that 
he or she has produced and responds to an internal representation of the object 
which is influenced by the self-produced heard sound.  
In the inner speech condition (figure 3d) when the individual sees the object 
he or she does not produce any externally audible sound. However, the sight of 
the object evokes in the individual not only the internal representation of the 
object but also, through the connections leading from the sensory-motor module 
to the linguistic module, the internal representation of the sound that designates 
the object. Through the connections leading from the linguistic module to the 
sensory-motor module, this internal representation of the sound that designates 
the object can influence the internal representation of the object in the sensory-
motor module. The results of the both the private language and the inner 
language conditions (figure 2d and 2e, respectively) confirm the prediction that 
categorization is improved not only by social language, but also by talking to 
 oneself. In fact, both self-produced and internally-thought labels improve 
internal representations of perceived objects more or less to the same extent as 
external speech. 
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Figure 3. Experimental conditions for testing internal representations. The process of activation is 
divided up into a sequence of discrete time steps. Numbers indicate connections that are involved in 
each time step. See text for details. 
4. Conclusions 
Using a very simple neural network model of language acquisition it has been 
possible to demonstrate that using language for oneself can improve an 
individual’s categorization of the world. We conclude that human language may 
have emerged not only due to social pressures, i.e., because language made it 
possible to have more sophisticated forms of social communication and 
coordination, but also due the advantages that language conferred on the 
cognitive functioning of the single individual when it is used to talk to oneself, 
either aloud or internally. Since these advantages can be demonstrated even with 
the very simple “language” of our simulations, we conclude that it is not 
necessary for language to be as sophisticated and complete as present-day 
language to provide individual cognitive advantages but that these advantages 
were probably already present in the very early stages of the evolutionary 
emergence of human language. 
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